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Cogito ergo… sum? 
The problem of subjectivity constitutes one of the most crucial issues in contempo-
rary philosophy, especially the  philosophy of mind. An attempt to describe the 
structure  and  the    role  of  conscious  experience  may  help  us  to  lay  theoretical 
grounds for further research  on this particular matter. When it comes to under-
standing the subject, which for a long time was based on Cartesian philosophy, . 
the area of subjective experiences was regarded as an objective base for systematic 
enquires into the human mind (Bremer 2008: 43). According to Descartes, during 
the process of introspection we obtain the so-called privileged access to our (men-
tal) states and, thus, we cannot be wrong about them. This infallibility was suppo-
sedly supported by the fact that we always experience our states as our own and 
from the first-person perspective. The role of personal reports as reliable indica-
tors for a theory of human consciousness was also founded on  19th-century psy-
chology, which continued to use the method of introspection. Therefore, the first-
person perspective in the research on consciousness was for a long time an ac-
cepted  approach  in  the  traditional  philosophy  of  subject  .  However,  at  present 
there is a tendency to renounce this kind of an approach to subjectivity. Introspec-
tion has been recognized as an unreliable, and above all, insufficient way of de-
scribing  the  human  mind.  Together  with  the  progress  in  neuroscience  and  the 
widespread cooperation between philosophers and empirical researchers, in re-
cent years the so-called reductive approach to subjectivity has gained popularity 
According to this approach, subject’s mental life and the subject itself can be re-
duced to a particular experience generated by neural activity (Metzinger 2004), or 
the very existence of the experience of self can be questioned (Prinz 2012). We are 
going to  look at two philosophical propositions that annihilate the subject in some 
sense, and consider whether the issue of subjectivity has been resolved or not.   
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I – that is, no-one 
Recent  years  have  brough  a  lot  of  attention  to  Thomas  Metzinger’s  thesis  that 
“there is no such thing as a self” (Metzinger 2009: 1) . Metzinger denies the exis-
tence of a metaphysical self, arguing that the notion of self does not refer to any 
observable things in the world. Therefore, the self cannot be real, where Metzinger 
recognizes a thing as being real only if it can be explained according to the rules 
and  methodology  of  science  (Zahavi  2008:  101).  On  the  other  hand,  Metzinger 
points out the fact that the concept of self is, for some reason, quite common – 
which is why it is worth taking a closer look at how it could be affected by the 
structure of our experience. While investigating the sphere of human subjectivity, 
Metzinger  discovers  that  it  is  characterized  by  certain  stable  patterns,  i.e.  first-
person perspective, the sense of ownership in reference to our thoughts or feel-
ings, and something even more basic – the sense of “being oneself.” This sense of 
being oneself is understood as pre-reflexive and refers to the sense of oneself being 
identical through time. In spite of the fact that this experience is hard to grasp, 
Metzinger tries to analyze it carefully and to determine its minimal conditions. He 
does so by referring to experimental situations which manipulate the other prop-
erties of experience, especially first-person perspective (Blanke & Metzinger 2009). 
As a result, he argues that the crucial matter for developing a sense of self is the 
experience of one’s own body. 
Still, if the self – as Metzinger claims – does not exist, our experience of ourselves 
must be an illusion. And so it is - Metzinger calls it “the ego tragedy.” We live in a 
constant illusion generated by our own brains. A human brain, being nothing but 
an information processing  cognitive system, processes information in a way that 
creates a simulation of the surrounding reality as well as ourselves. However, this 
process is inaccessible to a subject, which results in our impression of being in di-
rect contact with the world and ourselves. It has its evolutionary explanation, as it 
enables us to orientate in the environment and – what is important for this paper – 
to feel that we are ourselves.  
Metzinger writes that his goal is to convince readers that the experience of being 
oneself can be in a satisfying way explained in subpersonal terms (Metzinger 2004: 
2). In his attempt to characterize the sense of self, he engages also other levels of 
description: functional, informational/ computational, representational and at last, 
phenomenological (303). By showing how subjective states, including the sense of 
self, are correlated with brain functioning, he wishes to build a bridge between 
philosophy and science (4). This claim is of great importance here, as it unites all of 
the concepts presented in this paper.  
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The awaited self 
As it has already been mentioned, while criticizing the metaphysical self, Metzin-
ger acknowledges the existence of a phenomenal self, which his theory of subjec-
tivity tries to describe. However, we can also hear voices that deny the existence of 
the metaphysical self as well as the phenomenal self. The American philosopher 
Jesse Prinz in his paper  “Waiting for the self” (2012) refers to Hume’s so-called 
“bundle theory” (Bremer 2008: 178). According to this theory, the self is identified 
with  a  bundle  of  flowing  impressions,  replacing  one  another  through  the  time. 
There is no reason to believe that we can distinguish a self as an enduring thing 
that would be something else apart from impressions. Still, Prinz is not interested 
in a metaphysical reading of Hume’s thesis, but he calls attention to the fact that 
among  many  different  phenomenal  qualities  that  constitute  our  experience,  we 
cannot find any that could be described as „I-qualia” (Prinz 2012: 124). While expe-
riencing a particular thing, we deal only with the qualities that make up the expe-
rience of this thing. At the same time Prinz stresses two possible ways in which we 
can read the claim that there is no such thing as I-qualia apart from the qualities 
that are given in perception. We can say that there are I-qualia, but they are re-
duced to other qualia (reductive claim) or we can say that there is no such thing as 
I-qualia (eliminativist claim). Prinz supports the latter claim, showing the weak-
nesses of both reductive and non-reductive views of the phenomenal self. By refer-
ring to different ideas of how the self can be grasped – for example the studies of 
brain activity or psychological experiments – he argues that we cannot point to the 
experience of oneself as a subject, neither at the phenomenal level, nor by looking 
for neuronal correlates of this kind of experience.  
Prinz suggests  that waiting for the self to come is similar to waiting for Godot 
(Prinz 2012: 148). However, he says that although we do not experience the self 
directly, somehow it becomes present through its own absence. How is that possi-
ble? We can refer to certain characteristics of our experience, such as stable first-
person perspective, the fact that the experienced qualia depend on our sensory 
apparatus and that we cannot experience things that are not within the reach of 
our senses. As Prinz puts it: “the self is absent if we look for it, but is always al-
ready there in each act of looking” (Prinz 2012: 149).  
The self under a magnifying glass 
Both Metzinger and Prinz begin their philosophical observations with rather radi-
cal theses: “nobody was or had a self” (Metzinger 2004: 1), “there is no [..] pheno-
menal I” (Prinz 2012: 123). But when we analyze their views further, we can see 
that, firstly, they are not as radical as they might seem at first sight, and secondly, 
that  they  have  something  in  common.  Both  philosophers  admit  that  the  self  is 
present to some degree - in the way it structures our experience (Prinz) or addi-
tionally in the elusive but distinguishable feature of ”feeling like oneself” (Metzin-
ger). What is more, both philosophers believe that the phenomenal self can be - 
and should be - a subject of empirical studies. Metzinger in his works refers to the  
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results from neurobiology, neurology, psychiatry and other disciplines belonging 
to cognitive science. In his analyses there can be found examples of psychological 
disorders caused by neurological dysfunctions, or altered states of consciousness. 
All of them are to become the basis for comprehensive research on the subjective 
experience with the application of scientific methodology. Similarly, Prinz men-
tions philosophical attempts at capturing the self by using methods of brain imag-
ing. By pointing out their shortcomings, at the same time he becomes a voice mak-
ing the case for careful research planning and even more careful analyses of their 
outcomes.  
Some of the aspects of presented conceptions, such as their interdisciplinary cha-
racter and inquisitiveness in discovering even the most vague facets of the self, can 
likewise be found in the views of Dan Zahavi, whose story about subjectivity we 
present in this issue of AVANT (see: his interview in this issue). Other aspects of 
these theories, such as their intended revolutionary and controversial character, 
have become the object of Zahavi’s criticism. 
Self as someone 
Dan  Zahavi  has  already  been  our  guest  in  T/2011  AVANT,  when  we  presented 
translations of his works concerning naturalization of phenomenology and studies 
on the self. In the paper dedicated to the latter subject (“The complex self: Empiri-
cal and Theoretical Perspectives,” Polish translation – “Złożona jaźń: Perspektywy 
empiryczne i teoretyczne”, 2011), Zahavi presents his opinion on the matter of in-
vestigating the self, addressing above all the issue of validity of this kind of re-
search, seemingly undermined by the aforementioned philosophical approaches. 
The Danish philosopher brings attention to the problem raised also by Prinz, that 
is, the issue of necessity of philosophical reflection on different understandings of 
“self” and of implementing the results of philosophical analyses into empirical re-
search (for example, of developmental psychologists, psychiatrists). As Zahavi ob-
serves, many empirical researchers use different concepts of the self (Zahavi 2011), 
which  causes  nothing  but  confusion  in  a  matter  which  is  already  complicated 
enough. Zahavi dedicates a passage of his text to mentioning the variety of philo-
sophical definitions of self, including Neisser’s and James’s typologies. At the same 
time he refers to Metzinger’s theory of subjectivity, which is based on – as it was 
said before – the critique of the notion of self as not referring to any real thing in 
the world. But as Zahavi argues, this kind of „reified” understanding of self is not 
the only one that is offered by philosophy. Hundreds of years of investigating what 
the self is have brought a wider range of theoretical opportunities than merely the 
self in the Cartesian sense, seen as unchangeable and enduring substance (Zahavi 
2011). The mutual work of philosophers and scientists has made it possible to ex-
plore the topic not only from the theoretical, but also the practical standpoint.  
In effect, Zahavi pays attention to the phenomenon of interdisciplinary research 
which has increase its popularity over the last few years and which – also accord-
ing to Metzinger and Prinz - has made an important contribution to the research AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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on the self. As Zahavi writes: “the self is so multifaceted phenomenon that various 
complementary accounts must be integrated if we are to do justice to its complexi-
ty” (from the paper: „The complex self: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives” 
that was originally presented during the symposium  “Phenomenology, cognition 
and neuroscience” on 19.02.2010 in Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA). Inte-
grating different options – also in the field of philosophy itself – is regarded by Za-
havi as a part of the role of philosophy. As we can read in the interview  in this 
issue of AVANT: “Reality is complex, and in order to do this complexity justice we 
need a diversity of complementary perspectives. This applies not only to the rela-
tionship between theoretical (philosophical) and empirical perspectives, it is also 
relevant to philosophy per se.” As we can see by reading the interview, Zahavi ac-
tively promotes interdisciplinary research by managing the Center for Subjectivity 
Research in Copenhagen. The Center is a place where many specialists from differ-
ent disciplines meet, people who believe that the self is a topic worth exploring. As 
we can find out on the website of the Center, the main idea of the Center is that 
“the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of cognition, action, sociali-
ty, and experience” (http://cfs.ku.dk/about/). That is why Zahavi – in opposition to 
Metzinger and other supporters of the thesis that self doesn’t exist – persistently 
claims that instead of „being no-one” we should be talking about „being someone” 
(Zahavi 2005). Discussion concerning this problem is still open though, as Zahavi 
admits in our interview: “I do not believe that we at some point will be able to 
close the debate, so that we from then on no longer have to deal with and wonder 
about what it for instance means that something is real, what it means to be a self, 
etc. For the same reason, I also think that most of the systematic problems I work 
with are and will remain open.”  
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